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Compensation consultants are an integral part of the
process of determining executive pay in large listed companies.
This study reports interview-based research with protagonists
in setting executive compensation in twelve FTSE 350
companies and addresses why the consultants are used, what
they do, and how they are perceived.
Consultants have several important roles. Firstly, they
act as experts, providing market data and advising on plan
design and implementation. Because of this role, they not only
guide their clients as to the requirements of the market, they
also help create those selfsame market practices and norms.
They also have a role in liaison with institutional
shareholders, either with or on behalf of the committee.
Companies and committees select consultants based on
their reputation, with personal contacts playing an important
part in the choice. Consultants use impression management
techniques to ensure that their reputations remain strong.
Reputation is important for all parties, as the use of
consultants also acts to legitimize the decisions of the
remuneration committee in this increasingly contentious area.
However, there is much debate about the consultants'
independence and their practices, which could reduce such
legitimacy. This Article considers how the legitimacy is
evidenced, and corcsiders the ways in which committees and
consultants are working to maintain it.
This Article contributes to the literature on
compensation consultants by taking a qualitative approach,
providing explanations of current practice which give
background and context to the ongoing debate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consultants have an important role in advising remuneration
committees on the determination of executive compensation1 in listed
companies. Their work encompasses supplying data on pay in
comparator companies, advice on the choice and design of
remuneration schemes, modeling the implications of the suggested
schemes, advice on taxation, preparation of documentation,
implementation of the selected schemes, and liaison with institutional
shareholders. They are acknowledged experts in their field.
There is, however, a catch. It has been suggested, both by ex-
consultants and by regulators, that consultants have conflicts of
interest which can lead to biases and result in lax structures or
excessive levels of executive pay.2 Despite this widely held view,
academic research is equivocal. 3
Although concerns over the use of compensation consultants
date back two decades, and although several studies of executive
remuneration have considered at least some aspect of the work of the
1. In this Article, the U.K. term "remuneration" and the U.S. term "compensation" are
used interchangeably with the more generic "pay."
2. For books written by individuals who had previously worked as compensation
consultants, see GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF
AMERICAN EXECUTIVES (1991) (alluding to the author's experience as a consultant); A.P.
WILLIAMS, JUST REWARD? THE TRUTH ABOUT TOP EXECUTIVE PAY (1994) (same). For regulators'
views from three major jurisdictions, see STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV'T REFORM,
110TH CONG., EXECUTIVE PAY: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AMONG COMPENSATION CONSULTANTS 3
(Comm. Print 2007) (prepared for Chairman Henry A. Waxman) [hereinafter WAXMAN REPORT]
(finding major conflicts of interest in setting executive compensation due to management's
influence over the process); TREASURY COMMITTEE, BANKING CRISIS: REFORMING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND PAY IN THE CITY, 2008-9, H.C. 519 [hereinafter U.K. TREASURY COMMITTEE
REPORT] (exploring compensation in the City of London and describing the interaction between
various actors in the private sector); David Wright, Deputy Dir., Gen. Internal Mkt. and Servs.,
Closing Remarks at the European Commission Services Roundtable on Directors' Remuneration
(Mar. 23, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/company/docs/directors-
remunroundtable -wright-en.pdf (summarizing contemporary issues of executive pay within the
European Union).
3. For example, Martin J. Conyon, Simon I. Peck, and Graham V. Sadler found no
conclusive evidence of conflicts of interest leading to excessive pay. Martin J. Conyon et al.,
Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United
Kingdom, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., Feb. 2009, at 43, 43 (2009). Likewise, Brian Cadman, Mary
Ellen Carter, and Stephen Hillegeist found no clear evidence that conflicts drove excessive pay
levels for CEOs. Brian Cadman et al., The Incentives of Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay,
J. ACCT. & ECON. 263, 263 (2010). Mixed results were reported in Kevin J. Murphy & Tatiana
Sandino, Executive Pay and "Independent" Compensation Consultants, 49 J, ACCT. & ECON. 247,
247 (2010). They found that higher levels of pay were related to the potential conflict of interest,
although, contrary to one of their hypotheses, consultants employed by the board were associated
with higher levels of CEO pay than those employed by the management. A full review of the
literature is included in Martin J. Conyon, Executive Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay,
64 VAND. L. REV. 399, 411-17 (2011).
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consultant, until recently, very few articles had directly examined the
impact compensation consultants have on executive pay. Regulatory
developments have changed this. In the United Kingdom, the
introduction of the Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations
("DRRR") 4 has mandated disclosure of details of remuneration
committee advisors since 2002. In the United States, the Securities
and Exchange Commission introduced requirements for disclosure in
the Compensation Discussion and Analysis ("CD&A") in 2006,
including disclosure of the roles of consultants advising the
compensation committee, their names, and the scope of their work.
These data have stirred academic interest.
A number of recent papers have considered the activities of
compensation consultants in the United Kingdom and the United
States. 5 This Article adds to that literature. It is one of very few
studies to adopt a qualitative research approach to the work of the
remuneration committee,6 and the first to focus on the work of the
compensation consultant. Using data from interviews with
protagonists in remuneration-setting for selected FTSE 350
companies, 7 it addresses the questions of why consultants are used
and what they do, and explores their perceived strengths and the
limitations of their work. In doing so, this research supplements
quantitative research, provides some background and context to other
papers that are appearing in this field, and informs practice in an area
which is increasingly contentious. In rich detail, this Article shows
some of the attitudes behind the words companies use in their
remuneration reports. It suggests that the use of compensation
4. Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, 2002, S.I. 2002/1986, art. 3, § 234B
[hereinafter DRRR], available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20021986.htm.
5. See, e.g., Conyon, supra note 3, at 411-17, 426-27 (finding no conclusive evidence that
conflicts of interest among consultants lead to higher executive pay); see also Martin J. Conyon et
al., New Perspectives on the Governance of Executive Compensation: An Examination of the Role
and Effect of Compensation Consultants, 15 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 29, 29-58 (2011) (finding
some evidence that where consulting firms supply other services to a corporation, CEO pay is
higher).
6. For qualitative studies of executive compensation practices, see Ruth Bender, How
Executive Directors' Remuneration Is Determined in Two FTSE 350 Utilities, 11 CORP.
GOVERNANCE 206, 206 (2003); Martin J. Conyon et al., The Structure of Executive Compensation
Contracts: UK Evidence, 33 LONG RANGE PLANNING 478, 478 (2000); Brian G. M. Main et al., The
Remuneration Committee and Strategic Human Resource Management, 16 CORP. GOVERNANCE
225, 225 (2008); Stuart Ogden & Robert Watson, Executive Pay and the Search for Legitimacy:
An Investigation into How UK Remuneration Committees Use Corporate Performance
Comparisons in Long-Term Incentive Pay Decisions, 61 HUM. RELATIONS 711, 711 (2008);
Stephen Perkins & Chris Hendry, Ordering Top Pay: Interpreting the Signals, 42 J. MGMT. STUD.
1443, 1443 (2005).
7. The FTSE 350 are the 350 largest companies on the London Stock Exchange, by market
capitalization.
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consultants can be best explained using theories of legitimacy: by
taking outside advice, the compensation committee legitimizes its
decisions in the controversial area of executive pay.
The structure of this Article is as follows. Part II briefly
reviews relevant research. This is followed in Part III by an
explanation of the research approach adopted for this work. The
findings of the work are set out in Part IV and discussed in Part V.
The Article then concludes.
II. REVIEW OF PRIOR RESEARCH
Prior research has acknowledged the important role
consultants play in the remuneration-setting processes of large
companies.8 Three main themes underlie much of the work in this
area:
1. How consultants are used as experts. They provide data on
pay in peer companies so that committees can choose where to set
compensation levels. They also provide advice on structuring
remuneration plans.
2. Whether, or how, the level and structure of executive pay
differ between companies that take advice from compensation
consultants and those that do not.
3. How consultants are perceived to confer legitimacy on
remuneration packages by providing external input into the
committees' decisions.
A. The Consultant as an Expert
1. Providing "Market" Data
There is no obvious answer to the question, how much should
we pay the executives? By custom and practice, pay is set in line with
a self-defined "market," which is determined by reference to a group of
peer companies. 9 Although for some businesses the human resources
("HR") personnel collect these comparator data, in most larger
companies this work is done by, or with the aid of, remuneration
consultants. The consultants maintain detailed databases of the pay of
their own clients, as well as surveying compensation details publicly
available on other listed companies. These data are more
8. Conyon et al., supra note 5, at 30.
9. Perkins & Hendry, supra note 6, at 1457; Ruth Bender, The Platonic Remuneration
Committee 14 (Paper Presented at the 5th International Conference on Corporate Governance,
Birmingham, England, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1647005.
[Vol. 64:2:361364
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comprehensive than those available to the HR personnel, and often
more up-to-date. Specifically, remuneration consultants provide both
generic pay surveys that cover, for example, all FTSE 350 CEOs, and
surveys that are tailored to the needs of their clients, for example,
relating to a specific role or dealing with a subsector of a particular
industry'
Several authors have commented upon the use of these pay
surveys, rarely favorably. Two criticisms are common: the impact of
the choice of peers (also known as comparators) and the impact of
surveys themselves on the general level of executive compensation. As
regards the comparators used in the surveys, Luis Gomez-Mejia and
Robert Wiseman referred to "a cottage industry of consultants that
specializes in conducting surveys to measure a wide range of CEO
compensation statistics."1 They suggested that, although this is a
widespread practice, not much is known about the use of such
"competitive market going rates." A decade later, the problem
remains. It has been said that the choice of appropriate comparators is
perhaps the most difficult problem that confronts the remuneration
committee.' 2  Nonetheless, custom and practice dictate that
compensation be set in relation to a peer group. Accordingly,
committees need these data and rely on the advice of compensation
consultants, who have great discretion in selecting and framing the
issues and presenting the data to the committee. 13
Regardless of the validity of the comparators, the consultants'
surveys themselves are widely seen as a cause of ever-increasing
levels of executive pay. 14 Although this is unsatisfactory, no other way
10. RUTH BENDER, THE DETERMINATION OF DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION IN UK LISTED
COMPANIES, ICAEW BRIEFING 4-6 (2004), available at http://www.icaew.co.uk/index.cfm?
route=117888; Main et al., supra note 6, at 226.
11. Luis R. Gomez-Mejia & Robert M. Wiseman, Refraining Executive Compensation: An
Assessment and Outlook, 23 J. MGMT. 291, 327 (1997).
12. Ogden & Watson, supra note 6, at 716.
13. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 38 (2004) (detailing compensation
consultants' broad discretion in performing their tasks); Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the
International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven? 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1193
(2004) (noting that consultants "supply the justifications needed to rationalize" a corporate
compensation decision).
14. See, e.g., Arch Patton, Those Million-Dollar-a-Year Executives, in EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION, A STRATEGIC GUIDE FOR THE 1990S 43 (Fred Foulkes ed., 1991) (suggesting that
the surveys were the main source of executive pay inflation in the United States, with companies
choosing to pay at or above the average of the surveyed range). Similar findings were recorded in
U.K. studies. See, e.g., Conyon et al., supra note 6, at 487 (noting the potential of surveys to
"ratchet-up" executive pay); Mahmoud Ezzamel & Robert Watson, Market Comparison Earnings
and the Bidding-Up of Executive Cash Compensation: Evidence from the United Kingdom, 41
ACAD. MGMT J. 221, 223 (1998) (highlighting that the availability of comparable wage surveys
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has been found to determine executive pay, and the use of consultants
to advise on peer groups and gather supporting data is ubiquitous.15
2. Advising on Scheme Design
Remuneration committee members, all of whom are non-
executive directors 16 of the company, are not expected to be experts in
the minutiae of scheme design, and they need independent advice in
order to carry out their tasks.17 This advice comes from the
compensation consultants, who provide an expert knowledge base over
and above that which the company possesses internally.18 This
knowledge base is evidenced by the way in which consultants advise
on plan design, displaying their technical knowledge of the different
types of plan that are possible, their market knowledge of what is
acceptable, and their experience with successful implementation.
The consultants do more than reflect the body of knowledge
surrounding executive pay: they also help to create it. In an example
of normative isomorphism, the practices they follow are promulgated
around the various companies they advise, until often they become
seen as "best" practice. 19 As Kyungmook Lee and Johannes Pennings
reinforces the influence of the external labor market); Perkins & Hendry, supra note 6, at 1445
(reiterating that a perverse outcome of proliferation of salary surveys was to ratchet-up salaries
overall).
15. See, e.g., BENDER, supra note 10, at 14; Conyon et al., supra note 3, at 45 (emphasizing
the problems associated with using surveys in setting executive pay); Rezaul Kabir & Marizah
Minhat, Multiple Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay (May 31, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1646926 (noting
the prevalence of compensation consultants in setting CEO pay).
16. Throughout this Article, the U.K. term "non-executive" or "non-executive director"
("NED") is used. This corresponds to the U.S. terminology "director."
17. See Main et al., supra note 6, at 230 (noting that the remuneration committee is seen as
a "generalist committee" whose members "invariably made reference to the part consultants play
in the process"); Bertrand Malsch et al., Risk, Blame and Allegiance in Compensation
Committees: A Cultural Theory Perspective 20-21 (Universit6 Laval, Qu6bec Working Paper,
2009) ("[Remuneration committee] members' competencies are not perceived as being sufficient
for committees to carry out their duties in an effective manner; outside parties (especially
consultants) ... are seen as playing a key role in this respect.").
18. See, e.g., Conyon et al., supra note 5, at 33 (noting that compensation consultants are
"clearly external" and possess "skills, accreditation and experience from repeated interactions
with those at the upper echelons of companies").
19. See, e.g., SYDNEY FINKELSTEIN & DONALD HAMBRICK, STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP: TOP
EXECUTIVES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON ORGANIZATIONS 275-79 (1996); Paul DiMaggio & Walter
Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in
Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 149-50 (1983) (describing the application of
"isomorphism" to organizational behavior); Jonathan Trevor, Exploring the Strategic Potential of
Pay: Are We Expecting Too Much? 6 (Judge Bus. Sch., Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No.
02/2009, 2009) (noting that the adoption of perceived winning strategies as "best practices"
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note in relation to the broader discipline of management consultancy,
"As external consultants or internal experts, professionals may play
an important role in trend setting and legitimizing new templates."20
This is illustrated specifically for compensation consultants:
"[Consultants] keep promoting what they think is the industry norm,
and we ask, 'Is it the industry norm that you have suggested?' And
then they promote to another company and then to a third company..
so it's become an industry norm.'"21
3. Impression Management
It is not sufficient for consultants to be experts; they must
appear to be experts. A thread of papers discusses consultancy as an
exercise in impression management. 22 The works occupying this
thread argue that the deliverables from consultancy are intangible,
making them difficult for the client to assess and to compare with
other providers. Hence, proxies are used to assess the value of what is
being bought and what has been received. Such signals include the
consultants' reputation and client base, the words they use to describe
their expertise, and their appearance, literature, and presentations.
These are all seen as indicators of the quality of the advice, and
ultimately consultants use them to signal that their clients are
adopting best practice.23
within an industry "is an additional institutional mechanism through which isomorphism
occurs").
20. Kyungmook Lee & Johannes Pennings, Mimicry and the Market: Adoption of a New
Organizational Form, 45 ACAD. MGMT. J. 144, 149 (2002).
21. Conyon et al., supra note 6, at 488.
22. See, e.g., TIMOTHY CLARK, MANAGING CONSULTANTS: CONSULTANCY AS THE
MANAGEMENT OF IMPRESSIONS 62 (1995) ("In order to create the impression of a high quality
service . . . consultants must focus their efforts on the active management of the interaction
process with clients."); Matthias Kipping, Trapped in Their Wave: The Evolution of Management
Consultancies, in CRITICAL CONSULTING: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE MANAGEMENT ADVICE
INDUSTRY 28, 40 (Timothy Clark & Robin Fincham eds., 2002) ("Consultancies therefore build
their credibility and reputation indirectly through the use of a wide variety of symbols.");
Timothy Clark & Graeme Salaman, Creating the 'ight" Impression: Towards a Dramaturgy of
Management Consultancy, SERV. INDUS. J., Jan. 1998, at 18, 19 ("[Ihe art of impression
management ... is at the core of consultancy work.").
23. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 22, at 28 ("A number of studies have reported that
reputation of a consultancy and its consultants is the more important criterion identified by
clients to select between consultancies."); Kipping, supra note 22, at 39-40 ("[C]ompanies cannot
hire just any consultancy. Rather, the one selected has to be perceived by others as being up-to-
date, modern, etc."). Anecdotal evidence suggests that reputation is a strong factor in helping
companies choose between consultants. Robin Fincham & Mark Evans, The Consultants'
Offensive: Reengineering-From Fad to Technique, 14 NEw TECH. WORK & EMP. 32, 37 (1999),
discuss how consultants use glossy pamphlets with superb graphics as a proxy to demonstrate
the quality of their underlying product. Consultants' reputation is enhanced by displaying an
368 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:2:361
B. Influence on the Level and Structure of Executive Pay
In recent years, several researchers have examined the
influence of remuneration consultants on the level and structure of
executive pay, in particular considering whether the use of
consultants is reflected in the nature of the schemes adopted. 24
Although there are differences in approach, many results of these
studies are similar. It is well known that company size is correlated to
levels of executive pay and, as would be expected, it is mostly the
larger, more complex companies that employ consultants.25 However,
even allowing for size, the use of compensation consultants does
correlate to higher pay levels for the CEO.26 Using consultants also
has an implication for plan design. Research has shown that
companies using consultants tend to use more equity-based incentives
in their pay packages than do companies that do not use such advice. 27
These results could be explained in two different ways. On the
one hand, it may be that companies seeking to use equity-based plans
extensive blue chip client base and network, which is a symbol of quality. See, e.g., Timothy
Clark & Graeme Salaman, Telling Tales: Management Gurus' Narratives and the Construction of
Managerial Identity, 35 J. MGMT. STUD. 137, 151 (1998) ("Gurus' stories in part claim authority
by referencing other famous, successful, senior clients .... "); Karen Legge, On Knowledge,
Business Consultants and the Selling of Total Quality Management, in CRITICAL CONSULTING:
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE MANAGEMENT ADVICE INDUSTRY, supra note 22, at 77-78 (analyzing
the reputation-building rhetoric in the claims present in a British management consultancy
firm's "glossy brochure").
24. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3. See also Leena Kostiander, How Consultants
Increase Executive Remuneration: A Process Approach (July 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the author) (providing interview-based evidence from Finland).
25. See, e.g., Conyon et al., supra note 5, at 46-49 & tbl.4 (presenting evidence that firm
size positively correlates with seeking external compensation advice); Georgios Voulgaris et al.,
Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay: UK Evidence, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE 511, 515 (2010)
(presenting evidence that firm size correlates with compensation). Cadman, Carter, and
Hillegeist found that seventy-three percent of Russell 3000 firms retain a compensation
consultant, compared to eighty-six percent of their sample of S&P 1500 firms. Cadman et al.,
supra note 3, at 276.
26. Chris Armstrong et al., Economic Characteristics, Corporate Governance, and the
Influence of Compensation Consultants on Executive Pay Levels 20-21 (Rock Ctr. for Corp.
Governance, Working Paper No. 15, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1145548
(finding a positive correlation even when economic determinants, including company size, were
statistically controlled); Murphy & Sandino, supra note 3, at 254-55 (same). Conyon, Peck and
Sadler suggest that one reason for these higher pay levels is that the greater proportion of
equity-based pay in consultant-designed packages means that the executives need extra
compensation for their additional risk. Conyon et al., supra note 3, at 52.
27. See, e.g., Conyon et al., supra note 3, at 52 (providing U.K. and U.S. evidence); Voulgaris
et al., supra note 25, at 512 (providing U.K. evidence), And, in a unique context, a study of
practices in Finnish state-owned enterprises-where executive pay is regulated-suggests that
consultancies exploit loopholes by designing complex schemes that favor management.
Kostiander, supra note 24, at 33-34.
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realize that this is a complex area and thus decide to employ
consultants to advise on and implement these plans. Alternatively, it
could be because the consultants' default setting is to use complex,
equity-based plans. If the latter is true, this could be a result of
consultants' desire to demonstrate that they are adding value (doing
something that their clients could not do unaided), or it could arise
due to a potential conflict of interest between their work for the
company (represented by its compensation committee) and their
relationship with its CEO.
Much is written about the potential for consultants to
experience such a conflict of interest.28 Kevin Murphy and Tatiana
Sandino propose two underlying sources of conflict: a wish to retain
the client in subsequent years and a desire to cross-sell their other
services to the company.29 This has affected the pronouncements of
regulators on both sides of the Atlantic. A U.S. House of
Representatives committee concluded that "[c]ompensation consultant
conflicts of interest are pervasive," and recommended that the
consultant the board retained should not perform other work for the
company.30 Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the House of Commons
Treasury Committee, examining the role of executive compensation
practices in the financial crisis, suggested that there was an
"incestuous relationship between consultants and the remuneration
committees that they were advising."31 Its final report concluded:
We have received a body of evidence linking remuneration consultants to the upward
ratchet of pay of senior executives in the banking sector. We have also received evidence
about potential conflicts of interest where the same consultancy is advising both the
company management and the remuneration committee. Both these charges are serious
enough to warrant a closer and more detailed examination of the role of remuneration
consultants in the remuneration process.
32
Nonetheless, academic research on the impact of conflicts of
interest has produced mixed results.33
28. See, e.g., Murphy & Sandino, supra note 3, at 248 (discussing "repeat business" and
"other services" conflicts); John Plender, It Pays to Simplify Boardroom Compensation, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, at 15 (labeling compensation consultants "an unregulated and conflicted
bunch").
29. Murphy & Sandino, supra note 3, at 248.
30. WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 2.
31. Banking Crisis: Hearing Before the House of Commons Treasury Committee, at Q575
(2008) (to be published as H.C. 1167-iv), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm200708/cmselectlcmtreasy/ucl167-iv/ucl16702.htm.
32. U.K TREASURY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, para. 82.
33. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. A few studies have found such evidence. For
example, the Waxman Report found a correlation between the extent of a consultant's conflict of
interest and the level of CEO pay. WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-7. A Finnish qualitative
study by Kostiander reported consultants' bias in favor of management. Kostiander, supra note
20111 369
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C. Using Consultants to Confer Legitimacy on the
Committee's Decisions
The non-executives on a remuneration committee are in a
vulnerable position, having to work in a collegiate manner with the
executives in a unitary board structure, but also having a
responsibility for monitoring governance and determining the
executives' pay.3 4 Many observers accuse these directors of being too
close to the executives, and thus, consciously or unconsciously, biased
in favor of high awards.35 Murphy suggests that this is an unconscious
bias, but that "[flaced with a range of market data on competitive pay
levels, committees tend to error on the high side."36
One important role for the consultant is as an independent
party to the pay process, providing impartial advice and thus
conferring legitimacy on the committee's decisions. 37 This can also be a
form of risk management on behalf of the committee. Given that there
is no single right answer to most questions on executive compensation,
the committee and the board use advice from consultants to justify
any decisions that are later challenged.
24, at 31. A U.K. study also found evidence that the consultants are concerned with the risk of
losing business. Kabir & Minhat, supra note 15, at 17-18. Nonetheless, the bulk of the extant
research is equivocal, either showing no evidence of conflict of interest or only slight correlations.
For example, neither Armstrong et al., supra note 26, at 6, nor Cadman et al., supra note 3, at
272, found support for claims that CEO pay is higher in companies advised by multi-business
consultancies, and Conyon et al., supra note 3, reported no evidence that a potential conflict of
interest affected contract design. However, Murphy and Sandino, supra note 3, at 260, in an
analysis for the United States and Canada, had mixed results. Conyon reviews this literature,
setting out details of the samples and methodologies in these studies, and concludes that there is
no clear-cut evidence of the effect of a conflict of interest. Conyon, supra note 3, at 411-17, 426-
27. Thus far, the lack of academic evidence of the detrimental effects of conflict of interest has
not affected regulatory pronouncements on the subject.
34. Laura F. Spira & Ruth Bender, Compare and Contrast: Perspectives on Board
Committees, 12 CORP. GOVERNANCE 489, 490-96 (2004).
35. Brian G. M. Main et al., The CEO, the Board of Directors and Executive Compensation:
Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 4 IND. & CORP. CHANGE 293, 326-28 (1995); Brian G.
M. Main & James Johnston, Remuneration Committees and Corporate Governance, 23 ACC. &
BUS. RES. 351, 534-36 (1993); Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF
LABOR ECONOMICS 2485, 2517-18 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999).
36. Murphy, supra note 35, at 2518.
37. See, e.g., Mahmoud Ezzamel & Robert Watson, Pay Comparability Across and Within
UK Boards: An Empirical Analysis of the Cash Pay Awards to CEOs and Other Board Members,
39 J. MGMT. STUD. 207, 210 (2002) (summarizing how compensation committees must "strike a
balance" between providing financial incentives to executives to improve firm performance while
also maintaining legitimacy through using external benchmarks to establish pay); Main et al.,
supra note 6, at 234 (discussing the desire to attain perceived legitimacy in the remuneration
process); Ogden & Watson, supra note 6, at 714 (discussing the importance of issues of legitimacy
in the analysis of executive remuneration).
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A useful illustration of how consultants are used to legitimize
pay decisions is an examination of a sample of U.S. compensation
committee reports to determine how they justified their compensation
choices to their shareholders. 38 The use of consultants was frequently
the mechanism adopted to obtain external validation. Harry Barkema
and Luis Gomez-Mejia referred to this phenomenon as "judgments of
the committee members, legitimized by the opinions of external
consultants."39 In many situations where a decision cannot be proved
to be "right," such legitimacy is valuable to boards, as it gives
companies access to outside resources. 40
However, legitimacy is an intangible that can only be achieved
if the consultants are perceived to be independent, and we have
already seen that this independence can be challenged due to potential
conflicts of interest. The governance commentator Robert Monks
stated this somewhat pointedly:
A critical question of corporate legitimacy is whether CEOs set their own pay. "Best
practice" has decreed an elaborate "ritual" through which the board of directors creates
a Compensation Committee consisting entirely of "independent" directors.... Likewise,
when the independent members of the Compensation Committee appoint an
independent executive compensation consultant to assist them, one need suspend
disbelief as to the appetite of personal service organizations to bring unwelcome advice
to their clients.
4 1
Authors familiar with the workings of the industry have
confirmed the difficulties this conflict causes. 42 Not surprisingly, those
currently working as compensation consultants dispute the existence
of such difficulties. Evidence the consulting firms gave to the House of
Representatives Committee 43 emphasized the firms' independence:
38. James B. Wade et al., Worth, Words, and the Justification of Executive Pay, 18 J. ORG.
BEHAV. 641, 641-44 (1997) (concluding that companies with concentrated and active outside
ownership were more likely to justify their compensation practices by citing the role of
compensation consultants, as were those paying their CEOs large base salaries).
39. Harry G. Barkema & Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, Managerial Compensation and Firm
Performance: A General Research Framework, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 135, 141 (1998).
40. Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 574 (1995).
41. Robert A.G. Monks, Executive and Director Compensation-1984 REDUX, 6 CORP.
GOVERNANCE 135, 137 (1998).
42. See, for example, two authors who had previously worked as compensation consultants,
Marc Hodak, Alignment Exposed: How CEOs are Paid, and What Their Shareholders Get for It,
16 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Spring 2004, at 111, 112 (suggesting that the retention of consultants
depends on whether the scheme they devised has paid out, regardless of performance), and
Vadim Liberman, It's Not Our Fault-Usually, ACROSS THE BOARD, Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 51, 53
(quoting a CEO's comment: "The basic goal of compensation consultants is to justify whatever it
is the CEO wants to make.").
43. WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 2.
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Representatives of two of the consultancies, Towers Perrin and Hewitt Associates,
testified that they have clear internal divisions separating employees who deal with
compensation committees from those who work with executives and management. The
two firms are "diversified" companies, offering both executive pay advisement and other
services such as human resources management.
44
Both researchers and the press also report the view that U.S.
consulting firms are improving their practices by segregating those
who provide advice on executive compensation from those working on
other assignments for a company. 45
However, recent developments in the consulting industry
reflect the firms' growing awareness that they need to tackle this
perceived conflict of interest more directly. In February 2010, Hewitt
Associates, one of the larger firms, announced that it was spinning off
its executive compensation consulting activities. The accompanying
press release commented that the decision "creates opportunities for
us to expand our relationships with those clients that may have felt
restricted from engaging Hewitt for broader consulting and
outsourcing work because we were the executive compensation
consultant to their board."46 In a similar fashion, Ira Kay, a high-
profile compensation consultant at Watson Wyatt, left that firm in
January 2010 to run his own boutique consultancy specializing in
executive compensation. 47
In the United Kingdom, the use of separate consultants to
advise the remuneration committee has become more common practice
44. L. Reed Walton, Pay Consultant Concerns Debated, RISKMETRIcS GRP. BLOG (Dec. 7,
2007, 10:21 AM), http:/Iblog.riskmetrics.com/gov/2007/12/pay-consultant-concerns-
debatedsubmitted-by-l-reed-walton-publications.html.
45. Murphy and Sandino refer to interviews with senior consultants who stated that
previously acceptable practices had changed, and their firms now had "Chinese Walls" between
the different parts of their practices in order to prevent such conflicts. Murphy & Sandino, supra
note 3, at 261. Attempts by U.S. consulting firms to improve these practices are also discussed by
Julie Creswell, Pressing for Independent Advice from Consultants, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, § 3,
at 9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/08/business/yourmoney/O8consult.html?_r=l.
46. Rebecca Moore, Hewitt Announces Spinoff of Comp Consulting Business, PLANSPONSOR,
Feb. 1, 2010, http://www.plansponsor.com/HewittAnnounces-Spinoff..ofComp-Consulting
_Business.aspx.
47. One article reported Mr. Kay as saying that "he opened his own shop because the
proposed SEC rule, federal bill and merger accord had cost him three of his 20 board
assignments at companies where Watson Wyatt or Towers Perrin provide pricier management
services." Joann S. Lublin, More Boards Opting for Independent Pay Advisors, WALL ST. J., Jan.
11, 2010, at B7, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703535104574646
823950331160.html. Watson Wyatt and Towers Perrin merged in January 2010. In June 2010,
Towers Watson issued a press release stating that it would continue to offer executive
compensation services, but clients wishing to retain separate advisors were recommended to use
Pay Governance LLC, the spin-off consultancy created by Mr. Kay and others. See Press Release,
Towers Watson, Towers Watson Aligns Executive Compensation Consulting Strategy with
Evolving Range of Client Needs (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.towerswatson.com/press/1753.
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since the implementation of the DRRR in 2002, which demands
disclosure, inter alia, of the names of consultants advising the
remuneration committee, the nature of their involvement, and
whether or not the committee appointed the consultants. This may be
one reason why the use of multiple consultants is more prevalent in
the United Kingdom than the United States,48 with one study
suggesting that more than half of FTSE 350 companies use more than
one consultant.49
III. RESEARCH APPROACH
This research forms part of a study conducted in the United
Kingdom on how executive directors' pay was determined in selected
FTSE 350 companies. Previous work in this field has examined the
policies adopted by companies and the sums awarded. This research
differs from prior studies by focusing on how companies determine
their executive compensation policies and packages, rather than
examining the outcomes of their decisions. To do this, the study adopts
a qualitative methodology.
The work was interview-based, with the interviewees primarily
being CEOs, remuneration committee chairs and members, and HR
professionals from twelve companies in all, together with five of the
compensation consultants advising those companies.
The sample of companies was initially selected from the
PricewaterhouseCoopers Corporate register, identifying FTSE 350
companies that appeared to be in compliance with all relevant aspects
of the Combined Code, and which appeared to the author to present an
interesting context for study.50  Companies were contacted by
telephone to seek their involvement in the project; companies one
through six joined the study via this approach. This process of finding
research participants proved to be slow, and companies seven through
48. See Conyon et al., supra note 3, at 47-49 (discussing U.K. disclosure regulations and the
general prevalence of the use of executive pay consultants).
49. Kabir & Minhat, supra note 15, at 2-3.
50. Case companies where NEDs sat on several different boards were preferred, as it was
considered that they would be able to comment about a wider range of practices in addition to
the focal company. Also, utilities and financial services companies were favored, as representing
two ends of the pay spectrum. Utilities in the United Kingdom have an interesting position
relating to directors' remuneration-it was the high pay and option awards made to directors of
the newly privatized utilities that led to the "fat cat" debate, which resulted in the Greenbury
Report of 1995. DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION: REPORT OF A STUDY GROUP CHAIRED BY SIR
RICHARD GREENBURY (1995) [hereinafter GREENBURY REPORT], available at http://www.ecgi.
org/codes/documents/greenbury.pdf. Indeed, the Greenbury Report had a separate section
(section 8) that discussed the criticism of pay in the privatized utilities.
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ten were contacted through a network of remuneration professionals
that one of the early interviewees identified. Interviews were
conducted at companies eleven and twelve following a conference
presentation by the author of papers setting out some of the research
results. Of the companies, four were utility companies, three were
from the financial services sector, and the remainder were from other
industrial sectors; nine were in the FTSE 100 index, and the other
three were in the FTSE 250.
Table 1 sets out some information about the interviewees from
the twelve companies.
Table 1: Company Interviewees by Role
Co. HR Remuneration NED CEO Company Company Consultant Total
professional conunittee secretary chairman
chairman
1 2 1 1 1 1 6
2 1 1 1 1 1 5
3 1 1
4 1 1 3
5 1 5
6 2 2
7 1 1 1 1 7
8 1 1 2
9 1 1
10 1 1
11 1
12 1 1
Total 12 5 5 4 3 1 5 35
Additionally, five interviews were conducted with an
institutional representative, head-hunters, a group of remuneration
professionals, and a focus group brought together to discuss the
results of the research. 51 In all, the author conducted forty individual
and group interviews between 2001 and 2003.52 The interviews, which
lasted on average one hour, were taped and transcribed.
51. The use of such a focus group as a method of verification for qualitative research is
recommended by MATTHEW B. MILES & A. MICHAEL HUBERMAN, QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS:
AN EXPANDED SOURCEBOOK 275-77 (2d ed. 1994).
52. The limitations of the study must be acknowledged. The work reflects a series of
interviews conducted during 2001-2003. Since then, the regulatory framework in the United
Kingdom has changed, which is likely to have led to changes in practice. Thus, were this
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Remuneration committees were far more circumspect about
making available their documentation than they were about arranging
interviews.53 Nevertheless, documentation, such as remuneration
committee meeting minutes and consultants' reports, was reviewed for
five of the companies. Apart from one very anodyne set of committee
meeting minutes emailed to the author, these reviews were conducted
on the companies' premises, often under the supervision of company
personnel. No copying of the documents was permitted, and in one
instance the company secretary reviewed the author's hand-written
notes on completion of the exercise. Also examined were financial
statements (which included the published remuneration reports) for
all companies for the preceding, current, and immediately subsequent
years.
The interview transcripts, notes, and company documents were
analyzed using NVivo to manage the data. They were coded to reflect
what was happening in the companies, and the theoretical
perspectives that this reflected.
IV. FINDINGS54
In this Part the findings from interviews concerning the role of
the consultants in remuneration decisions are set against the
summary of prior research and accented using narratives taken from
the websites of some of the United Kingdom's main remuneration
consultants. 55
research to be conducted today, some differences would be expected. However, in the process of
preparing and reviewing this Article, during 2008 and 2009 drafts were discussed with two U.K.
compensation consultants and one ex-consultant, to confirm the continued applicability of these
findings.
53. Their explanation was that the documentation supporting their decisions included
references to detailed information for individuals, which many were not comfortable with
sharing.
54. This Part includes many quotations taken from interviews with executive compensation
consultants and others, whose job titles are included in parentheses at the end of the quotes,
conducted as part of the author's original research for this Article. The original source material,
including interview transcripts and recordings, is on file with the author, subject to the
confidentiality agreements signed with the participants. See infra note 59.
55. See NEW BRIDGE STREET CONSULTANTS, http://www.nbsc.co.uk/ (accessed July 30,
2007); TOWERS PERRIN, http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/jsp/masterbrandlobby.jsp (accessed
July 30, 2007); WATSON WYATT, http://www.watsonwyatt.com/europe/ (accessed July 30, 2007).
Following the merger of Towers Perrin and Watson Wyatt, their websites are no longer online.
The source material for the information provided by these two sources is on file with the author
and the Vanderbilt Law Review. The selection of the consultancies was based on the analysis by
Conyon et al., supra note 3, at 49.
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In line with other research findings, 56 all but one of the twelve
companies participating in this research used remuneration
consultants to advise on their schemes. 57 As regards the number of
consultants used, the situation was quite complex and is summarized
in Table 2.
Table 2: Number of Consultants Used58
Number of consultants used for advice on schemes Number of
companies
doing this
One firm of consultants used at any one time. (For four of these companies 5
there was an ongoing relationship with the consultants-although two
had changed consultants in the last couple of years. The other company
used different consultants as appropriate.)
Two firms employed at the same time, one being the main consultant and 4
the other for specific plan advice or a review.
Two firms employed at the same time, one for the company/management 2
and the other to advise the remuneration committee.
No consultants employed for advice. 1
The research approach, using semistructured interviews, does
not lend itself to statistical analysis of the results. Table 3 sets out the
range of responses and practices the participants discussed.
56. This level of use of consultants is in line with the findings of Conyon et al., supra note 3,
at 47-49, and Murphy & Sandino, supra note 3, at 249-50.
57. The protagonists in the company that did not use consultants felt quite strongly about
this. See infra Part IV.F.
58. The interviews were conducted before the DRRR came into force. For a more current
view, the latest remuneration reports (2008-2010) were reviewed for nine of the twelve
companies (the other three no longer exist independently). They showed that one company used
three consultants, three companies used two consultancies, and the remaining five used just one
consultancy firm for advice to the remuneration committee. These figures and Table 2 exclude
use of consultants for data on comparator pay levels; companies used several sources for this.
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Table 3: Practices Discussed by Participants 59
Tenure of the One company used different consultants each time; some
consultants companies had changed consultants within the last two to
three years; several had kept the same consultants for "quite a
few years."60
Use of consultants to Of the eleven companies using consultants, five used them to
liaise with the liaise with the institutions, and one used the consultants to
institutional investors draft a letter that went out in the remuneration committee
chairman's name. When the consultants were liaising with the
institutions, this was generally (but not always) done together
with the remuneration committee chairman and/or the HR
director.
Consultant attendance at In none of the case companies did the consultant
remuneration committee automatically attend every remuneration committee meeting.
meetings Attendance was on an ad hoc basis, generally related to the
introduction of a new scheme.
Use of consultants to In three of the companies, the remuneration committee asked
help write the the consultants to provide significant input to the
committee's published remuneration report.
remuneration report
Separate consultant for In two of the companies, it was standard to have separate
committee and for other advisors for the committee and the executive. One other
company activity company had done so in the past, and another used its own
consultants to advise on the introduction of a new scheme.
Appointment of There was a wide range of practices. In one case, the
consultants by either the remuneration committee controlled the process, with minimal
committee or the involvement of executives. In several companies, the
executive (e.g., HR appointment appeared to have arisen with input from the
function) non-executives and the executives. In two companies, the HR
function made the decision with minimal committee
involvement.
A. How Companies Choose Their Consultants
In selecting remuneration consultants, the consulting firm's
reputation was an important factor in all of the case companies.
Personal recommendations also influenced the choice, for example,
59. Confidentiality requirements agreed with participants mean that further detail of the
responses cannot be disclosed.
60. This is based on interviewees' recollections. Data were not always available to enable
the author to determine the exact tenure of the remuneration consultants.
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from a board member who had worked with the firm or the particular
individual consultant before.
In a few cases the selection was a matter for the remuneration
committee, with little input from the executives, although in some
instances the HR director made recommendations for a shortlist for
the remuneration committee to consider. In other cases, the HR
professional chose the consultants outright. Overall, there was no
common thread in how the consultants had been engaged. As one
consultant noted:
We were invited by [the HR director and manager]. One doesn't always know the
background to this, but we had done a lot of work for [committee chair's other company]
for about fifteen years .... So I suspect, although I have no way of knowing, that that
helped us to win the project.
In this case, the appointment was made via the HR function,
although all of the parties interviewed were of the opinion that the
relationship with the committee chair had been an advantage in
getting appointed.
Personal relationships were mentioned in several of the
interviews. For example, some interviewees mentioned that the
consultants were chosen because they had acted for another company
known by the NEDs, or because the parties knew the consultants from
attending seminars or other similar functions. In light of the
fragmented nature of the executive compensation consultant industry
and the fact that a select handful of firms dominate the industry,61 it
is not surprising that the major consultancy firms are well known by
many of the decisionmakers.
In the case above, no mention was made of any shortlist or
"beauty parade" in the consultant appointment process. This differed
from the process in another company, where the committee made the
decision to change advisors due to the longevity of their appointment
and their resultant closeness to management. The HR professionals
made suggestions but then stood back from the process, and the
remuneration committee made the ultimate selection:
And the committee's just changed its external advisers. They did that really without our
help. We set up the beauty contest and the process, but they made those decisions on
their own. Paradoxically they asked at the last minute if we were going to be involved.
We said that we never envisaged that we would be responsible for selecting your
external advisers. (HR professional)
This was at variance with the comments made by the HR
director of another case company, who had himself made the
61. Conyon et al., supra note 3, at 49-50.
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appointment because "the remuneration committee aren't the
remotest bit interested."
Importantly, the majority of the interviews were carried out
between late 2001 and early 2003, a time when the remuneration
landscape in the United Kingdom was changing and, in particular,
there was a drive for more rigor in the process. 62 The effect of these
changes is captured in the following long quote, which shows how one
company decided to involve the committee more.
Well, essentially, historically the company 6 3 has tended to put forward a proposal to the
remuneration committee to say, "Look, we're going to work with [consultant name] on
this, is that OK? Any objections?" But we've actually got a project that we are about to
start now, and we've agreed a new process whereby although we still basically review
and go through the tender process, the chairman of the remuneration committee is also
involved and actually would sign the engagement letter. So we actually have moved
from it being largely company-driven to it being a genuine joint appointment. And I
think it's fair to say it's a joint appointment. And if anything, we can say that the
remuneration committee had the right of veto. So if [the chairman of the remuneration
committee] did not like the firm or the individual lead consultant, then we would abide
by his wishes and have to re-tender again. (HR professional)
This involvement of the committee is qualitatively different
from the example given earlier, where the committee was in control of
the process. 64
In summary, although the case companies chose their
consultants in different ways, a common thread was present in the
62. The regulations and announcements during that period were as follows. DEPARTMENT
OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION: A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT (2001)
(U.K.), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/tna/+/http:llwww.dti.gov.uk/cld/
dirrem.pdfl. In June 2002 Ministers proposed regulations to force companies to disclose pay and
put remuneration policies to a shareholder vote. Tony Tassell, Ministers Move on Excessive
Executive Salaries, FIN. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at 2. The formal regulations on disclosure of
directors' remuneration came into force on August 1, 2002, as the DRRR, supra note 4. In 2002
the IASB issued an exposure draft that had an impact on how companies viewed options-based
compensation. EXPOSURE DRAFT 2, SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, available at http://www.fas123
solutions.com/documents/ED2%20from%201ASB.pdf. The whole role of the NED was re-
examined again in DEREK HIGGS, DEP'T OF TRADE & INDUS., REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS (2003), available at http://www.berr.gov.
uklfiles/file23012.pdf. A few months later the Department of Trade and Industry (the 'DTrF)
returned to the subject of executive pay, specifically as regards large payoffs for directors who
were leaving. Julia Finch, Hewitt to Act over Rewards for Failure, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 28, 2003,
at 20. In May 2003, for the first time, a company's remuneration report was voted down by
shareholders. Geoff Dyer, Investors Reject GSK Executive Pay Policy, FIN. TIMES, May 20, 2003,
at 1. DTI issued the consultation document "Rewards for Failure" in June 2003. DEP'T OF TRADE
& INDUS., "REWARDS FOR FAILURE" DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION-CONTRACTS, PERFORMANCE
AND SEVERANCE (2003). Finally within this period, a revised version of the Combined Code was
issued on July 23, 2003. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(2003), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uklpubs/uklallr_comcode2003.pdf.
63. By "the company" he actually meant the HR professionals.
64. Indeed, the following year's published remuneration report stated that the consultants
were appointed by "the company," not specifically the committee.
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rationale of each company's decision: they required the consultant to
provide expertise and legitimacy to their compensation decisions.
B. The Consultant as an Expert
The role of the consultant as an expert is twofold. Firstly,
consultants need a level of expertise to provide the advice their clients
seek. Additionally, they need to appear as experts to influence
potential clients to employ them, and to manage the expectations and
impressions of existing clients. 65
Given that pay is benchmarked against the market, an evident
and important role for the consultants is as a source of data for the
executive compensation market. Although U.K. regulation on
executive pay means that much comparator information is publicly
available, using consultant-generated data has two main advantages.
First, it outsources a mundane task, freeing up the time of HR
professionals who otherwise would have to look at many individual
annual reports for the underlying numbers. Second, the consultants'
proprietary data are often more up-to-date and more detailed than the
information contained in annual reports. The consultants' information
is more expensive however; thus, companies often mix and match self-
generated data and publicly available survey data with data from
consultants.
It is common for companies to use more than one consultant as
a source of data, even if they only have one consultant providing plan
advice. The reason for this is threefold. First, they get more data to
inform their decisions. Second, more sources of data are perceived to
provide more legitimacy for the pay decision. And third, committees
differentiate the consultants' offerings, with different firms perceived
to have different strengths.
[A] lot of the information is in the public domain. However, the advantage of using some
of the more up-to-date surveys rather than just the annual report data is that although
you're not going to get it company-specific, you are going to get it up-to-date. So we take
part and subscribe to surveys by [three consultancy firms named]. So we have a variety
of in-house data from those companies that we use. And then we very often use the
consultants then to verify some of that for us. (HR professional)
[Names two consultancies] They're now working together, because they both have
slightly different advantages and together it would be perfect. [Consultant 1] do a
massive amount of factual, it is just tables of facts for every company. And they do a
separate report on the [sector], drawn from the same base and split that again into
quoted and unquoted.... Whereas [Consultant 2] go deeper into that; but it's only a
subset. So it's a subset deeper. And there's others that touch both of those. But between
those two ... the remuneration committee gets quite a broad insight. (HR professional)
65. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 22.
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Although the committees made use of the consultants' data, it
is important to understand that they were aware of the potential flaws
and biases. Comments were made to the effect that surveys were
driving up executive pay levels, and in this respect individuals also
discussed their impressions that some consultants were always
slightly ahead of the others in the figures they produced. The following
quotes are illustrative.
You get these reports from the consultants saying, "Look, the median salaries are now
so much, and you are below it, and therefore you've got to go up to the median level or
whatever you want to be." And then of course you say, "yes, of course, everybody does
that, it just goes on and up and up." And so ... you always need to look at those sort of
arguments very sceptically. (NED)
These surveys are all indicative of what's going on in the marketplace; and in lots of
ways they can be mechanisms for upping the ante. (HR professional)
And by the way, one of them-and I'm not going to say which-is a firm that I think
never ceases to give information that you are underpaying. That's their stock in trade.
(Committee chair)
The committee chair who made that last comment added that
his committee could "see through" that advice and so they still used
those consultants for data supply.6 6 This is an important point: the
consultants do not make the decision on the pay schemes, they merely
advise. Several of the consultants emphasized that point, of which the
following is representative.
But the ultimate decision is that of the company. It's the company that makes the offer
of employment. It's the company that will reach its own decision, taking whatever
advice it may get to take, the advice may come from the remuneration consultant.
(Consultant)
The committee receives advice, but then has to choose what to
do with it. One of the marks of a consultancy assignment is that it
provides the views of that consultant or that firm, and their approach
may differ from others in the field, or indeed may change from
assignment to assignment.6 7 One consultant was very open about the
potential for differences between practices:
66. This company did not make the consultants' reports available for inspection, so the
author could not determine whether they had indeed "seen through" the consultants' figures and
acted accordingly. The significant increase in executive compensation over the last decade
suggests that such action is not often pursued. See, for example, Kate Burgess, Floored Boards,
FIN. TIMES, June 2, 2009, at 12, which quotes a U.K. survey by Incomes Data Services as
showing median total pay of chief executives of FTSE 100 companies to have risen 167 percent
between 2000 and 2008; that of full-time employees grew by 32 percent.
67. Chockalingam Viswesvaran & Murray Barrick, Decision.Making Effects on
Compensation Surveys: Implications for Market Wages, 77 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 588, 595 (1992).
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But in exactly that same situation another consultant may have slightly different views,
because to a degree we all carry some of our personal baggage with us, whether we
admit to it or not. (Consultant)
This can be seen in the way in which the firms approach
assignments. The consultants will set out the range of remuneration
in comparator companies (having themselves been very influential in
the selection of those comparators), and they will show whether the
target executive is at, above, or below median. But they do not make
the decision as to what action to take; sometimes they do not even
make a recommendation, but let the data speak for themselves. 68 And
it should be the companies who control the process, not the
consultants. Companies can choose how best to use their advisors.
And we're not a company that is very good anyway at using consultants by and large. So
we didn't [in the past] use consultants at all, we used the [names of two consultancies]
surveys, and made our own recommendations, and I went along and presented those
recommendations. This time for this particular review we're using [consultancy name]..
. And we're using them very specifically, not to review basic salaries, but to review the
structure of the package and to make recommendations with regard to these two areas
that I mentioned, as to how we deal with that. You know, if you're taking something
away from people, do you compensate them and so on. So they're working with us. We
don't anticipate that they'll be at this meeting. The new chairman is not desperately
keen to involve them in the meeting unless it's absolutely essential, and he'd expect us
to be on top of the numbers and the thinking. (HR professional)
These sentiments were reflected more broadly in a lot of the
interviews. Although consultants are useful, employing them was not
seen as lessening the responsibilities of the HR professionals to the
remuneration committee, nor of the committee to the investor
community. Advice is proffered; it need not be taken. One role for the
chair of the remuneration committee is to take a major role in
managing this process and in evaluating the quality of information
provided.69
Part of the consultants' expertise is evidenced in their
proprietary data, but they also provide valuable expertise on the
design and implementation of remuneration schemes, and on their
likely acceptability to the institutional shareholders. Both of these are
important to their clients.
Well, that was the recommendation of the consultant based on some research they'd
done and current best practice in those types of schemes. (Committee chair)
And [consultancy name], particularly when we want to get across some of the technical
issues, and where they can give assurance that other companies are doing similar
68. Although it is fair to say that the choice of the benchmarking data provides an anchor
point which influences the committee's decisions. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128-30 (1974).
69. Main et al., supra note 6, at 229.
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schemes-"this is nothing unusual, nothing to be alarmed about"- they play the "don't
frighten the horses" role, I think. (Company secretary)
In review of the websites of some of the prominent
consultancies, this knowledge and expertise is highlighted, as shown
in the examples below.70
We support these disciplines with extensive compensation data capabilities for
competitive benchmarking through our Global Compensation Databases and Executive
Compensation Resources Online. (Towers Perrin)
Using Watson Wyatt's proprietary long-term incentive valuation methodology, Present
Economic Value (PEV), to place an appropriate value on long-term incentives ...
(Watson Wyatt)
We complement our consultancy services with our unique database and continuous
research programme. (New Bridge Street Consultants)
In particular, we have produced a modified Black-Scholes valuation model in order to
value share option and long-term incentive grants. (New Bridge Street Consultants)
In parading their expertise to the world, the consultants are
conducting an impression-management exercise, positioning
themselves as an attractive source of advice. Their proprietary
databases of pay statistics are backed up by their many published
surveys and reports, together with seminars they run for the corporate
and institutional communities. These activities combine to set them in
people's minds as competent advisors. This is reinforced by the status
of their client lists: a blue-chip client base is another indicator of
quality. The requirements of the DRRR mean that the names of the
consultancy firms advising each company are now public knowledge.
But in case there were any doubts, many consultants publish details
of selected clients in their marketing literature and on their websites.
Consultants will also run tailored seminars for their clients, for
example an annual update on relevant plan- and market-related
matters. Again, this reinforces their position as experts, as well as
providing a service that is appreciated by the NEDs. 71
Consultants who have designed a sophisticated scheme have an
incentive to package and commoditize it, along with a potential
incentive to sell it to clients, sometimes without sufficient tailoring to
their own contexts. The consultants' recommendations need to be
acceptable to their clients and recognizable to the rest of the corporate
world, but consultants also need to demonstrate their ability to tailor
70. See supra note 55.
71. No formal training is currently required for an NED sitting on a remuneration
committee. Three of the five NEDs interviewed specifically drew attention to the fact that part of
their voluntary "continued professional development" activities included attending seminars
provided by remuneration consultants.
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their expertise to the needs of the company. 72 In one case, for example,
a new consultant was appointed because the committee and HR
professional were dissatisfied with the output from the previous
consultant, which was seen to be rather generic and insufficiently
tailored to that business context.
It was a rambling report which was a collection of data and research. It was not
"bespoke," if you like. That was fundamentally the problem. (HR professional)
The following quote sums up the views of many interviewees on
the flair and originality the consultants display in plan design:
And anyway, we were disappointed. I think probably the reason is that in fact these
remuneration consultants are a herd, just like the investment community are a herd,
and there is not actually very much original thought around. (Committee chair)7 3
One final indication of impression management is worth
mentioning. In presenting a draft of this Article to an outside
remuneration consultant (who had not been involved in the research),
he suggested that instead of referring to "remuneration schemes,"
reference be made throughout to "remuneration plans." He
commented that many consultants prefer this latter term, as it carries
less pejorative connotations and avoids notions of "scheming."
However, the interviewees (consultant and other) used both terms.
C. The Consultant as an Intermediary
An important role for the consultants, and one that reflects
their role as experts, is to serve as the liaison between the
remuneration committee, the institutional shareholders, and their
representative bodies, such as the Association of British Insurers
("ABI") and the National Association of Pension Funds ("NAPF"). In
all of the companies that used consultants, the consultants had a part
to play in this dialogue, orchestrating what was said, and often
participating in the discussions. Consultants in some instances
72. It is an odd fact of the consultancy industry in general that whilst consultants claim to
produce novel recommendations, and clients claim to employ them so to do, a consultant
producing something too different from accepted practice will be treated with suspicion, and so
fresh ideas can be stifled. The way in which consultants balance this tension is discussed by
Andrew Sturdy, The Consultancy Process-An Insecure Business?, 34 J. MGMT. STUD. 389 (1997).
73. However, it is also fair to say that remuneration committees are not comfortable with
the idea of adopting radically new schemes, as these are not "the norm" and might attract
unwelcome attention from investors. See, e.g., BENDER, supra note 10, at 9 (noting the distinct
tendency of companies to adopt schemes that are already in use, rather than implementing novel
schemes); Bender, supra note 6, at 206-08 (discussing investor attention and isomorphic
pressures that induce companies to act in similar ways); Conyon et al., supra note 6, at 486-88
(emphasizing that promotion of the industry norm); Kostiander, supra note 24, at 22-25
(discussing the difficulty in deviating from the dominant practice).
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advised their clients on which shareholders should be addressed
directly, and which should be advised through the ABI or NAPF. They
also drafted letters for the chair of the remuneration committee to
send to institutional shareholders, or even sent the letters under their
own names. Consultants might also collate the responses on behalf of
the company.
In relation to the long-term plans, which is what shareholders currently focus on
because they have to vote on them, once we've decided on the type of plan and the
conditions with the company, we would then go and talk to investors. This is before the
formal shareholders circular is posted. We would either do that ourselves, or we would
prepare a letter for the company to write, and then we would get involved behind the
scenes and liaise through the Association of British Insurers. (Consultant)
This was often done because both the companies and the
consultants felt that the consultants were more expert at "handling"
the institutions.
Another reason for using the consultants as the liaison was
because the consultants were the ones who had the expert knowledge
about the plans-both the detail of the schemes and their acceptability
in the marketplace.
Another institution came up with some very technical questions about EPS versus total
value, total shareholder value as targets. And we just felt we needed [consultant name]
to produce a few pie charts showing how many people accepted EPS versus total
shareholder value. (Committee chair)
You're holding, actually, all the cards. One, you understand the arrangement better.
You understand what each party doesn't know, and you are able to piece it together.
Whereas if both parties on both sides had more knowledge to start off with, they would
be able to talk more readily. But remn co chairmen, it's one of the things they do, and
they are not experts in the whole thing. And therefore the conversation doesn't go...
you're not talking at the right level to start off with, so how can you cover the breadth if
you haven't got enough knowledge? Whereas the consultants can go from here to there
easily. The institutions don't understand what you're actually giving them. So you
actually have to take them through what you're giving them. (Consultant)
7 4
Indeed, the appointment of consultants sometimes related to
how experienced they were with institutional liaison.
[Consultant name] are well-respected by the institutions, which is one of the reasons we
would always be very keen to work with them. So we started the process with the
institutional investors through [consultant name] early on in designing the scheme. So
we wrote to all our major investors with the outline of the scheme, asking for their
views. Through [individual's name], particularly, at [consultant name], who managed a
lot of the initial investor reactions, we made some changes to the scheme, so we were
very keen to ensure that we had no surprises at the AGM. It didn't quite guarantee
74. A conclusion that could be drawn from this quotation is that complex remuneration
schemes are being drawn up and implemented without the full understanding of those charged
with determining the remuneration or those voting on it. However, the sentiment was only
expressed in this form by one of the consultancy firms interviewed, and was not evident in the
other case companies.
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everything. And that [the institutions] had understood why we were doing what we were
doing. (HR professional)
Many of the consultants referred to the shareholding
institutions in material on their websites, as these examples
illustrate:75
Institutional shareholders have strong views on executive remuneration and are
prepared to vote against resolutions on remuneration at general meetings. You need to
take their views into account when designing remuneration packages. (New Bridge
Street Consultants)
Major investors are increasingly flexing their muscles and governments are taking an
increasing interest in this area. (Watson Wyatt)
The subtext of this is that misreading the institutional
shareholders could cause problems for the committee, and that
consultants who have particular expertise in this area will avoid such
difficulties. This reading reflects the general literature on consultancy,
which suggests that consultants reinforce management uncertainty
and insecurity, and then sell their services as providing reassurance
against these anxieties.7 6
At least one consultant referred at interview specifically to
their prowess in this area as an advantage in getting and keeping
clients.
I genuinely believe that we know the views of investors [better] than any other firm
you'll come across. (Consultant)
However, although the consultants relish this role, and
although it is often useful to the companies, the shareholders and
their representative bodies expressed a clear preference to talk to the
committee members themselves rather than passing everything
through consultants.
It's mostly us [who do the liaison]. But it is changing. There is a pressure from the
institutions that they want to see the company, really, rather than us. Which in some
ways I understand.... That dynamic is changing. (Consultant)
The company can put forward the chairman of the committee, the HR professional or
the consultants. At different stages in the process, each could be acceptable. But for the
set piece meeting when they are explaining to [us] what they are proposing to do, that
should be led by the remuneration committee chairman. And it's good if the chairman
can come without the consultants: it looks better. (Institutional representative)
75. See supra note 55.
76. Sturdy, supra note 73, at 408-09.
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D. The Consultant as a Legitimating Device
A fundamental part of the consultant's role is to provide
legitimacy for the decisions of the remuneration committee. This was
evidenced in several ways during the interviews.
In some instances, interviewees took the view that, although it
was not compulsory to employ consultants, it was seen as highly
desirable because it demonstrated that the committee had accessed
independent expertise. 77
[I]n due course, the way the DTI is going, the DTI will expect that you have taken some
outside views on salaries. And therefore there's no point any longer in saying, "I'm not
going to do that, it's a waste of money." I think that one of the criteria which we're told
will come out with the DTI paper is that they will insist that you have taken some
formal benchmarking exercises in arriving at salaries, so that's what we've done. (NED)
I think it was two years ago, in the light of corporate governance issues generally, I was
very concerned about our remuneration committee having its own specific and
independent advice. So it was my suggestion that we have a beauty parade and we
actually appoint a consultant to the remuneration committee. (HR professional)
You have to use consultants to value things. Because people expect an outside
independent valuation. (HR professional)
Other participants were anxious to highlight to the researcher
the probity of their processes, as evidenced by the involvement of
consultants.
[Our committee] would never have a meeting to discuss directors' or senior managers'
pay without surveys or consultants' documentation, to which it would pay close
attention. (NED)
Some were very blunt about the use of consultants as a
legitimizing exercise.
But I do think, there is no doubt that part of this process is a covering of the back. It
allows the board to say that it has consulted with consultants. (NED)
Interestingly, in two companies the HR professionals felt that
the presence of consultants was also useful to legitimize their own
recommendations to the remuneration committee, in that the
committee would give more credence to those recommendations
because of the authority the consultants conferred.
77. See ANNALISA BARRETT & PAULA TODD, TOWERS PERRIN, NACD BLUE RIBBON
COMMISSION REPORT ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND THE ROLE OF THE COMPENSATION
COMMITTEE 2 (2003), available at http://corpgov.net/wp-content/uploads/2OO/lliNACD_BRC_
Report.pdf (making a specific recommendation to "[e]nsure that committee has access to
appropriate independent expertise"). In the United Kingdom, see GREENBURY REPORT, supra
note 50, para. 4.17, for the suggestion that it is appropriate for the committee to draw upon
outside advice.
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We'd obviously have to get the consultants on board. I think if they're saying this is a
perfectly good idea then we tend to have the committee saying, well fine. (HR
professional)
Because in the end we realized that anything that went to the remuneration committee,
if it had the sign-off of the external advisers, for want of a better phrase, it stood a
better chance of getting through the remuneration committee. (HR professional)
Overall, it is apparent that each company believed that
consultants play an important part in legitimizing decisions, both
internally and externally, and that this ability to confer legitimacy
was frequently featured in the consultant selection process.
Nonetheless, as discussed in the next Section, there are problems in
using consultants to provide legitimacy for the committee's decisions.
E. Conflicts of Interest and the Appointment of
More Than One Consultant
Many companies use more than one consultant as a source of
data on market norms. Some also use different consultants for
different parts of the package, choosing, for example, one firm to
advise on pensions and another for the rest of the package, or one for
normal activity and another when considering changes to the plans.
However, although it is not universal practice, it has become more
common to see companies using separate consultancies to advise
management and the remuneration committee. One obvious reason for
this is the potential for "capture" of a consultant serving management,
which has the ability to award considerable fee-earning work.78
Although it is not always borne out in academic research, press
commentary often highlights this view. 79 The potential for conflicts of
interest was acknowledged by the consultants themselves.
And, you know, obviously people put pressure on you to change different elements of the
report.... I think that's when it does make a difference who we're reporting to. If we're
reporting to the executive team or we're reporting to the remuneration committee....
We have been involved in situations where the executive team is trying to put a bit of
pressure on to you, and in the end something has been put forward to the remuneration
committee but it may not have our name on it, in the sense that we then don't feel that
that fully represents our views. Whether the remuneration committee is aware of that is
another point, because, you know, in some cases we don't see [the committee].
(Consultant)
78. See supra note 2 for examples of concern over conflicting consultant interests leading to
escalated executive compensation.
79. One reporter deemed pay consultants "an unregulated and conflicted bunch" and an
insufficient bulwark against misaligned executive compensation. Plender, supra note 28. For
research, see the studies referenced supra note 3. However, note that Kostiander does find
evidence of capture, in the very specific context of Finnish state owned enterprises. Kostiander,
supra note 24, at 31.
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But yes you do come across difficulties between the execs who have appointed you or the
remuneration committee who have appointed you. And that's when you've got to know
who appointed you. Because at the end of the day if there is a conflict, you've got to go
back to the people who appointed you and say, 'look I cannot advise both of you."
(Consultant)
One instance of capture in particular was raised with regard to
conflicts of interest-more than one consultant made the comment
that if a plan "goes wrong" (that is, does not pay out enough) then the
consultant's appointment may be terminated. They are treated as a
scapegoat-as one consultant put it, "you're identified with failure." A
very public example of this in the United States was Countrywide
Financial, which reportedly changed consultants in order to obtain a
more generous compensation package for its chief executive.80
Interviews with consultants on this potential conflict of interest
produced mixed results. Some acknowledged this potential problem,
but stressed that they remained conscious of the fact that the
committee, not management, was their client, and their advice was
given in that context. They commented that their respect for their own
professional reputations would not let them give partisan advice.
I think what is important is the independence of an adviser to a remuneration
committee. And that independence is important. It's important to the committee, and
it's important to all of the other interested parties, including the executive population.
Including shareholders, whether they be private shareholders or institutional
shareholders. I think there are also some pressures on consultants to maintain that
position of independence. I have a kind of shorthand way of describing it. If you provide
advice to a committee, that advice should be such that if it were published, you as a
consultant would be able to defend it. (Consultant)
It is worth noting that credit rating agencies and firms of
auditors have used the same argument of professionalism and
reputation. Evidence presented to the U.S. House of Representatives
oversight committee has shown that the credit rating agencies
succumbed to the pressures of the conflict.8 ' The events surrounding
Enron indicated that at least one of the large auditing firms also acted
inappropriately.8 2 U.K. regulators, unconvinced by the consultants'
protestations of professional independence, recommended that
80. David S. Hilzenrath, Whom Do Consultants on Pay Work For?; House Report Says
Countrywide Adviser Boosted CEO, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2008, at Di. For United Kingdom
examples of firms changing their remuneration schemes and the rationales behind doing so, see
Ruth Bender, Onwards and Upwards: Why Companies Change Their Executive Remuneration
Schemes, and Why This Leads to Increases in Pay, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE 709, 713 (2007).
81. Alan Beattie, Rating Bodies 'Broke Bond of Trust, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at 7.
82. See Ken Brown & lanthe Jeanne Dugan, Sad Account: Andersen's Fall from Grace Is a
Tale of Greed and Miscues, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2002, at Al (recounting how an Andersen
auditor was removed from Enron's account after showing resistance to Enron's accounting
practices).
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consultants adopt codes of best practice to mitigate such conflicts in
the future, and this has since been addressed.83
Companies use remuneration consultants for much more than
advice on executive pay. Accordingly, if separate consultants are
employed to advise the remuneration committee, the company will
need to employ at least two firms. Various views were expressed on
the pros and cons of employing separate consultants for management
and the committee, either as one-offs or permanently. Some companies
had had multiple consultants for a number of years, and took it as the
norm.
[1mt's part of our core corporate governance policy that the remn co will be independently
advised. (Company secretary)
Other companies had brought in a dual structure, as they saw
it as emerging best practice and as one which confirmed the legitimacy
of the advice they were getting.
We've brought [Consultant 2] in because we'd always used [Consultant 1]. And we
wanted to make sure that, from the remuneration committee's perspective, they felt
ownership of the research being undertaken, and that it wasn't, if you like, a
management tool. I don't think there was any suspicion of that, it was just ... because
[Consultant 1 had] always been engaged by management ... I think it would just have
looked wrong. (Company secretary)
However, some companies-and some consultants-saw the
idea of two consultants as an unnecessary expense, and one with the
potential for conflict, as the consultants played off against each other.
Now in that sort of frame of mind you don't say across the table to [CEO], "you've got
your independent advisers, and I've got mine." You say, and this is how it would come
about, and I hope it never did because it would suggest crisis, by which time the
independence of the consultants, whatever area it's in, would be irrelevant. You say, "we
don't trust you . . . and we don't trust you and your colleagues to give us the right
information." That would be the point in time where I think a resignation would be a
swifter way of bringing the crisis to a head than saying please bring in [consultants] to
review this on our behalf because we don't like you working with whoever else it is.
(Committee chair)
Not really, no, I don't believe it does work. Provided that whatever adviser is being used
is a professional adviser, the advice that is being given-notwithstanding the comments
of some institutions-will actually be well thought out, professional, and therefore the
added value that another adviser can provide in terms of reviewing that will tend to be
83. The U.K. Treasury Committee suggested that remuneration consultants should adopt a
code of ethics. UK TREASURY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, para. 82. The Remuneration
Consultants Group, comprising consultants advising at least one FTSE 350 remuneration
committee, produced the VOLUNTARY CODE OF CONDUCT IN RELATION TO EXECUTIVE
REMUNERATION CONSULTING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (2009), available at http://www.
remunerationconsultantsgroup.com/assets/DocsThe%20Code%2ONovember%202009.pdf. The
recent spinoffs of executive compensation consultants reflect the firms' realization that they need
to address these issues. See supra Part II.C.
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relatively limited. And it will be more matters of opinion rather than fundamentally
saying "okay, this is wrong." (Consultant)
I think if you've got consultants who've got integrity, it's probably a waste of money.
(Consultant)
One of the consultants illustrated the potential for conflict with
reference to a company he had advised (not one of the case companies)
where using separate consultancy firms for management and the
committee had potentially led to increased packages.
[Wihen I first started to advise I was already on notice that the executives were taking
advice elsewhere. And they would come along to the remuneration committee looking at
one particular aspect of the remuneration package, whereas I was trying to take the
remuneration committee continuously down the line of total remuneration. And it's so
easy to do a knee-jerk reaction and say oh gosh, yes that data shows that our bonus plan
is so far behind the market .... (Consultant)8 4
The consultant pointed out that, although this issue had arisen with
management and the committee using different consultants, it could
also be a problem where a company or committee chose to use
different consultants for different parts of the package.
F. An Argument Against the Use of Consultants
As noted previously, eleven of the twelve case companies used
consultants to advise on plans.8 5 One did not. A very experienced HR
professional served this company. His thesis was that in order to
design an appropriate scheme, the designer needed a good
understanding both of plans and of the company's particular context
and culture. Given his background, he believed that he was more than
able to match the consultants' knowledge of plans. And, quite
reasonably, he argued that his knowledge of the company had to be
deeper than any external consultant could obtain. Thus he saw little
point in appointing external advisors.
I'm horrified when a lot of companies introduce new share schemes, and the discussions
with shareholders are led by consultants.... But they ought to know the scheme. That's
what I mean. We would expect that we'd invent the scheme, not the consultants. It's an
appalling thought to me to have a consultant to invent schemes for me. How could I
keep my self-respect if that happened? That's what I can't understand really, the way
other companies do it. Because with most consultants you will get their pet scheme.
How do you know if that's going to be any good for you? You want your own scheme. (HR
professional)
84. This consultant also commented on the need for integrity in dealing with some
remuneration committees (again, not in the case companies) who wanted justification for
increasing pay, for example by retrospectively redefining the calculations underlying a
performance measure.
85. See supra note 57.
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This view was supported in the interview with the chair of his
company's remuneration committee, who commented that the matter
was discussed with the committee annually, but that they saw no
benefit in using such advisors. 86 A review of the company's
remuneration report in the financial statements following the
interview date (by which time the new reporting requirements were in
force) showed that the company had since appointed consultants, but
that their role was specifically stated as being one of verification
rather than advisory.
However, tracking the company's remuneration reports in
subsequent years showed that the committee chair had since retired
(which appears to have coincided with the retirement of the senior HR
professional). In the following year, the committee appointed
compensation consultants for plan advice. This brief case study
illustrates the influence of individuals on policies, and lends support
to a comment made by Martin Conyon et al. that "those firms without
consultants may be idiosyncratic."87
V. DISCUSSION
Remuneration committees use consultants not only as experts,
but also for risk-management purposes to legitimize their decisions in
a contentious area. However, this can only be achieved if the
consultants themselves have legitimacy. Accordingly, in interpreting
these findings we must consider the approaches taken by both
committees and consultants.
It is useful to consider exactly what is meant by "legitimacy"
and how it is obtained. One definition of legitimacy is "a generalized
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable,
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions."88 Within a taxonomy of
legitimacies, the one that resonates with this discussion is procedural
legitimacy: "procedural legitimacy becomes most significant in the
absence of clear outcome measures . ..when 'sound practices' may
serve to demonstrate that the organization is making a good-faith
effort to achieve valued, albeit invisible, ends."89
This notion encapsulates the problem the remuneration
committee faces. There is no clear outcome measure, because there is
86. The HR professional was present during that interview, and the point was not pursued
in the conversation.
87. Conyon et al., supra note 3, at 49.
88. Suchman, supra note 40, at 574.
89. Id. at 580.
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no right answer in issues of executive remuneration. There are,
however, many wrong answers, as companies facing censure by media
and regulators will testify. So, having processes in accord with "best
practice" can provide legitimacy, immunizing the committee against
accusations of bias or imprudence. 90 Following best practice may not
be a sufficient condition to escape criticism, but the findings of this
research suggest that the interviewees and their committees believe it
almost certainly to be a necessary one. Alistair Bruce et al. comment
specifically on the role of remuneration consultants in this.
Occasional executive pay crises are readily dealt with through the firm's remuneration
committee utilizing specialized consultants and maintaining communication with
institutional investors. But, by and large, the conventions of conformity to codes (such as
that of the ABI) and adherence to procedures (such as seeking independent advice of
remuneration consultants and utilizing the remuneration report to explain the basis of
pay awards) provides executive pay with a legitimacy that would otherwise be absent.
9 1
Organizations can become legitimate by adopting structures
and procedures in line with their institutional environment.92
Adopting these processes is a risk-management tool. Companies that
do not do things by the book could be vulnerable to claims of
negligence, whereas following a defined process provides a defense.
"[M]anagers whose plans have failed can demonstrate to investors,
stockholders, and superiors that procedures were prudent and that
decisions were made by rational means. 93
This idea of legitimacy links closely to neo-institutional
theory's concepts of isomorphism. It suggests that there is a "best
practice," or at least a commonly accepted "good" practice, which
committees can follow. Such a convergence of practices is explained by
coercive, mimetic, or normative isomorphism. 94 In the arena of
executive compensation, all three are visible.95 In particular, the use of
remuneration consultants has become a part of good practice. 96
90. See Kimberly D. Elsbach & Robert I. Sutton, Acquiring Organizational Legitimacy
Through Illegitimate Actions: A Marriage of Institutional and Impression Management Theories,
35 AcAD. MGMT. J. 699, 700 (1992) (discussing how organizations seeking legitimacy can avoid
conferring negative impressions by employing socially acceptable procedures).
91. Alistair Bruce et al., Top Executive Remuneration: A View from Europe, 42 J. MGMT.
STUD. 1493, 1499 (2005).
92. John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as
Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 349 (1977).
93. Id. at 350.
94. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 19, at 150 (describing coercive, mimetic, and
normative isomorphism as the three mechanisms driving institutional isomorphic change).
95. Main et al., supra note 6, at 234; see also Bender, supra note 6, at 212-13.
96. Wade et al., supra note 38, at 644; see also Bruce et al., supra note 91, at 1499 (pointing
out how utilizing independent consultants is a procedure often followed to legitimize executive
pay).
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Indeed, the Greenbury Study Group, which was the foundation of U.K.
regulation in this area, legitimized some of its own findings with
reference to the remuneration consultants it had used for advice, and
set out a "Code of Best Practice," which in several places made the
assumption that companies would use consultants to provide data and
advice. 97
Remuneration committees use consultants to legitimize their
decisions. But as we have seen, the consultants themselves are under
attack due to a perception that their recommendations are swayed by
their potential conflict of interest. So, how do they maintain their own
legitimacy? One way to do this is to foresee changes in the
environment and adapt to these before they become serious. 98 It could
be said that the damning reports of legislators in the United Kingdom
and United States indicate that they missed this chance. 99
Nevertheless, the consultancy firms have changed and are changing
their practices to accommodate the new circumstances. By spinning off
separate practices, implementing Chinese walls, and changing their
operational practices, they are demonstrating an understanding of
what has alarmed outside constituencies. And by "professionalizing,"
with the larger firms in the United Kingdom joining together to
produce a voluntary Code of Conduct, 100 they are trying to take charge
of the debate themselves, rather than have regulation imposed upon
them.101
Changes in the environment in which remuneration decisions
are made are leading to changes in committees' decisonmaking
processes. However, the participation of remuneration consultants in
these processes is institutionalized and embedded in perceived good
practice. As the pay landscape shifts, their role will adapt, but will not
disappear.
97. GREENBURY REPORT, supra note 50, §§ A7, C2, C8, para. 4.17.
98. As suggested by Suchman, supra note 40, at 594-95, in which he describes perceiving
future changes as one of two major ways organizations maintain legitimacy.
99. See, e.g., WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 32-33; UK TREASURY COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 2, paras. 79-82.
100. See supra note 83 for the Remuneration Consultant Group's framework establishing the
Code of Conduct, and for the Code of Conduct itself.
101. This is a very British approach to a governance crisis. The Greenbury Study Group,
which was a non-governmental body set up by the Confederation for British Industry, addressed
public outrage about executive remuneration. GREENBURY REPORT, supra note 50, at 7. And the
1992 Cadbury Committee for Corporate Governance, on whose final report so many governance
regulations are based, was not formed by the Government, but was set up by the Financial
Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange, and the accountancy profession. Laura F. Spira,
Audit Committees: Begging the Question, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE 180, 181 (2003).
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article adds a new chapter to the growing literature on
compensation consultants, taking a qualitative approach to determine
the reasons why remuneration committees employ consultants, and
the ways in which they operate. Interviews were conducted with the
protagonists in the remuneration-setting decision in a selection of
FTSE 350 companies to determine why and how consultants are used.
The interviews reveal several clearly distinguishable roles for the
consultant. One function of the consultant is to act as an expert,
providing proprietary data against which companies can benchmark
pay, and giving insight and advice into the possibilities open for plan
design and implementation. In this role, consultants have a direct and
immediate influence on executive pay. That is, by influencing the
choice of comparators, consultants both identify and drive the market
for executive pay. They also bring to bear their knowledge of pay
plans, and their views on what is currently acceptable to the market,
thus spreading current practice more widely and institutionalizing it
as "best practice."
Consultants also act as liaisons-serving an important role in
the communication with certain institutional investors. The perceived
advantage of this is that they are experts, with experience in dealing
with the institutions, and so can argue the case more effectively than
could the company representatives on their own. Also, they can bring
to bear extensive technical knowledge in their explanations.
Nevertheless, as explained previously, in some cases the shareholders
would prefer to see more of the committee members and less of their
advisors.
A significant aspect of consultants' work is to legitimize the
decisions of the remuneration committee by providing an element of
perceived independence. Executive pay is a contentious area, and this
independent input into the process of determining executive pay
provides some legitimacy for the outcome. However, this route to
legitimacy is under threat as various constituencies question
consultants' independence. Consultants need to address this in order
to maintain and enhance their own legitimacy, and to continue to be
seen as a "best practice" solution. This Article has explored the ways
in which legitimacy is developing for the committees and their
consultants.
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In summary, the interview-based research reported in this
Article highlights the different roles played by compensation
consultants and emphasizes the importance of their function in setting
executive remuneration in selected large U.K. companies. The study
provides a context for other papers in this field, and can be used by
regulators and researchers to inform future work.
